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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Lex Loci Delicti Rejected In Torts Conflicts Of Law
Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc.'
On July 11, 1961, George Hambrecht, a resident of Pennsylvania,
boarded a United flight in Philadelphia bound for Arizona. The plane
crashed in Colorado, and Hambrecht, plaintiff's decedent, was killed.
The airlines, a Delaware corporation with principal offices in Illinois
and regular business activity in Pennsylvania, was sued in Pennsylvania
under the Pennsylvania Survival Act.2 The action was in assumpsit
against defendant airline and several of its employees and charged a
breach of contract to safely transport plaintiff's decedent to Arizona.
Plaintiff alleged the breach arose from the negligent operation and
management of the airplane. As permitted by Pennsylvania's statute,
the damages sought included loss of accumulation of prospective earn-
ings. The trial court held that since Colorado was the situs of the
accident, its law - and not Pennsylvania's - should be applied. The
Colorado Survival Statute3 does not allow recovery in tort for pros-
pective earnings; therefore, the lower court ordered plaintiff to amend
his complaint accordingly, apparently determining that the contract
label of the action did not change its essentially tortious nature. When
the plaintiff failed to do so, his plea was dismissed.
On appeal the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the lower
court and rejected the long-established tort conflict of laws doctrine of
lex loci delicti - the law of the place of the wrong governs. The court
seemed anxious to reconsider this old rule, for it glossed over several
procedural difficulties to reach its decision. Plaintiff based the suit
initially on a contract of "safe" carriage, which would not lie under
Pennsylvania law.' To maintain the suit, the court characterized the
complaint as one charging breach of contract of non-negligent carriage
and then held such a suit to be a viable cause of action, a point not previ-
ously determined in Pennsylvania. Finally, it refused to travel the
simple route of denial of conflict, i.e., declaring the Colorado law govern-
ing tort recovery inapplicable to this contract action. Instead, the court
rationalized the contract action into the equivalent of a tort complaint
in the same manner as the lower court, declaring, "Mere technicalities
of pleading should not blind us to the true nature of the action."5 By
this route, it reached the tort conflicts question.6
1. 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.603 (1949).
3. COLo. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 152-1-9 (Supp. 1960).
4. Implying an absolute liability of a carrier to his passenger, such a suit would
not lie under Pennsylvania law, which holds a passenger carrier only to a high degree
of care. Seburn v. Luzerne and Carbon County Motor Transit Co., 394 Pa. 577, 148
A.2d 534, 536 (1959).
5. 203 A.2d at 800.
6. Cf. Greco v. S.S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 34, 12 N.E.2d 557, 561 (1938). The
court apparently felt that the lex loci delicti rule was particularly outdated in light
of modern travel conditions.
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The court decided the case by adopting the more modern and
flexible "most significant relationship ' 7 approach to the problem of
tort conflicts. Noting that Colorado's connection with the controversy
was purely fortuitous, the court emphasized the far greater association
with the litigation which Pennsylvania had as the state of domicile of
the decedent and the place of probate of his estate. Additionally, the
court pointed to a provision of the Pennsylvania constitution" which
specifically prohibited the type of statute Colorado had passed to cover
situations of this nature.
Another recent decision has also used the most significant relation-
ship or contact theory. Dym v. Gordon' followed previously estab-
lished New York law" ° and used a contacts analysis to adjudicate a
7. This terminology is used in the RASTATFMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964):
"Section 379. The General Principle
(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with
the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities
in tort.
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining the state of
most significant relationship include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct occurred,
(c) the domicil, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of
the parties, and(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
(3) In determining the relative importance of the contacts, the forum will con-
sider the issues, the character of the tort, and the relevant purposes of the
tort rules of the interested states."
The comment to this section, id. at 8, notes, "The contacts mentioned above are not
exclusive although they are the most important. Any contact which can reasonably
be said to be of significance in connecting the occurrence and the parties with a given
state will be considered by the courts."
8. PA. CONST. art. III, § 21. ". . . but in no other cases [than Workman's
Compensation] shall the General Assembly limit the amount to be recovered for in-juries resulting in death .. "
9. 41 Misc. 2d 657, 245 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct. 1963), rev'd, 22 App. Div. 2d 702,
253 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1964), aff'd, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2054 (N.Y. Ct. App., July 27, 1965).
10. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
Cf. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133(1961) and Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 912 (1963). The Kilberg decision was not expressly reached through appli-
cation of the contact theory, although that was clearly the theory towards which the
court was moving. Involving recovery by New York residents for their decedent's
death in a Massachusetts plane crash, a situation much like that found in the main
case of Griffith v. United Air Lines, supra note 1, the question presented was whether
recovery was limited by a Massachusetts statute. The court held that this question
of damages was procedural and thus governed by the lex fori, the law of the forum,
which did not limit recovery. The concurring opinion of Justice Froessel castigated
this false procedure-substance distinction. Pearson arose out of the same plane
crash; holding the Kilberg decision did not violate the Full Faith and Credit clause,
the federal court forthrightly used "contact" language, Pearson v. Northeast Airlines,
309 F.2d at 561.
Finally, Babcock v. Jackson, supra, openly adopted the most significant relation-
ship approach in declaring New York the governing jurisdiction of a tort occurring
in Ontario between New York residents. See Comment, 62 MIcHi. L. REv. 1358, 1369-
70 (1964), where the Babcock decision is characterized as using a "dominant contacts"
approach rather than the strict RESTATEMENT (SECOND) view. Quite recently, a
lower court decision severely limited the application of Babcock, Long v. Pan Ameri-
can World Airways, Inc., 260 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1965). The
majority in Long declared, "The actual decision in Babcock is that a restrictive
statute of a foreign jurisdiction would not be applied to defeat a claim made by a
New York resident against another New York resident where the site of the accid.nt
was incidental to the enterprise in which the parties were engaged." 260 N.Y.S.2d
at 752 (italics added). A strong dissent noted there was "no indication that the
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personal injury question arising from an accident in Colorado in which
plaintiff, a New York resident, was injured while riding as a guest
with the defendant, also a New York resident. The trial court refused
to apply Colorado's Guest Statute," noting such factors as the merely
temporary residency of both parties in Colorado for academic pursuits
and the New York locus of defendant's insurance. The Appellate
Division also utilized a contacts analysis and reached an opposite
result. It reversed in a brief memorandum opinion, considering the
fact of residency in Colorado, however temporary; the totality of the
guest-host relationship in that state; and the beginning and end of the
joint trip in that state. 12
The contacts approach ostensibly employed in Griffith and Dyrm
is the latest method tried by American courts in handling the com-
plexities of tort conflicts of law.' 3 As noted, it has recently been in-
corporated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS. 4
Court of Appeals intended to make residence in New York a threshold requirement
for the application of the 'grouping of contacts' doctrine." Id. at 754.
11. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-1 (1953). Under the New York common law
governing this situation, plaintiff need prove no more than ordinary negligence by the
defendant. Colorado's statute, however, requires intentional, intoxicated or willful and
wanton acts by the defendant if the plaintiff was a guest in defendant's car and subse-
quently seeks to recover for injuries for which the defendant is allegedly liable.
12. Lilienthal v. Kaufman, ... Ore ... , 395 P.2d 543 (1964), is a recent Oregon
case in which a contact analysis was used to determine a contract conflict question.
The court denied recovery to a California resident under a California contract made
with an Oregon spendthrift, discussing at length the criticism of the well-recognized
contract conflict of laws doctrine of lex loci contractus - the law of the place of the
contract governs - analogous to the older tort conflict rule. Rejecting the old
doctrine, the court went on to adopt the same approach used in Griffith and Dym,
cataloguing the competing interests of Oregon and California in a search for the rnost
significant relationship in the case. In the outcome, however, public policy considera-
tions proved to be the controlling factors, and the court refused to enforce the contract
in the face of contrary Oregon law.
13. Three recent cases demonstrate the continuing controversial nature of the
most significant relationship approach in tort conflicts; one has rejected it and two have
adopted it. The Supreme Court of Delaware rejected the newer theory in Friday v.
Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (1965), declaring: "It may well be that the rule of lex loci
delicti in some instances may appear arbitrary and unfair, but at the same time it has
one positive asset. It is certain. The same cannot be said of the rule of more significant
relationship .. " Id. at 597. Holding that a New Jersey accident involving Delaware
residents was governed by New Jersey law, the court indicated any change in the
law was a legislative responsibility.
Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, decided by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2666 (June 22, 1965),
involved a suit by the widow of a Maryland resident killed in a plane crash in Brazil;
the defendant Brazilian airline had offices in the District, giving the federal court
there jurisdiction. The court noted that under both Maryland and federal law, plaintiff's
recovery was unlimited. However, declaring that, "The interest underlying the appli-
cation of Brazilian law seems to us to outweigh any interest of the District of
Columbia"; and further, that Maryland's interests are so limited that "even as between
the law of Maryland and the law of Brazil, we are without warrant to look to the
former", the court applied Brazilian law to limit recovery to $170. The decision cited
with approval the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, although it can be
more accurately characterized as a governmental interest analysis, see notes 20-30
infra and accompanying text.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals used the most significant relationship
approach and applied Texas law to determine a Mexican insurer's liability on a
Mexican automobile policy to a Texan third party injured in Mexico by the insured
Texan tortfeasor, Seguros Tepeyac v. Bostrom, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2006 (July 6, 1965).
The court noted, "Texas has an interest in protecting its citizens when there is a
breach of the insurer's duty to an insured Texan."
14. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964) § 379.
See note 7 supra.
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In the early stages of the law, the lex fori - law of the forum - strictly
controlled all aspects of a case. As foreign law became recognized
under the principle of comity" in the 19th century, the lex loci delicti
rule caused much criticism' 6 and was described by one writer as, "an
obligation springing to birth out of the soil at the possibly unsuspecting
actor's feet and hanging itself round his neck like an albatross ... ""
The results reached under this rigid system were occasionally hor-
rendous,'" and the desire of modern jurists for a more rational approach
has produced the recent cases espousing less doctrinaire views."
15. The concept of comity - recognition of a foreign sovereign's law - was intro-
duced to the legal profession in this country by Joseph Story, who was also notable
for his influence on the conflicts law of contracts. See Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries
on the Conflict of Laws - One Hundred Years After, 48 HARV. L. REv. 15, 22 (1934)
and Nadelmann, Joseph Story's Contribution to American Conflicts Law, 5 AM. J.
LEGAL HISr. 230, 243-50 (1961).
16. The principal charge leveled by commentators was that the courts' decisional
processes were different from the language of lex loci delicti that they used. Thus,
the RESTATEMENT was a false reflection of the actual judicial activity. See, e.g.,
Cook, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 35 COL. L. Rzv. 202 (1935) ; Garfinkel,
Conflict of Laws - A Survey of Past and Contemporary History, 16 HASTINGS L.J.
21, 22-32 (1964) ; Leflar, Choice of Law: Torts: Current Trends, 6 VAND. L. REv.
447 (1953) ; and Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case
Law, 19 TUL. L. Rtv. 165 (1944).
17. Smith, Torts and the Conflict of Laws, 20 MOD. L. Rsv. 447, 457 (1957).
18. Carter v. Tillery, 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. 1953), cited in Stumberg, "The Place
of the Wrong" - Torts and the Conflict of Laws, 34 WASH. L. REv. 388, 399 (1959),
is an extreme example of the harsh result the old rule could produce. Defendant
invited plaintiff and his wife to fly in a private plane from New Mexico to Texas. By
mistake they landed in Mexico and crashed when attempting a second take-off.
Plaintiff's wife was injured, but no redress was possible. All parties were Texas
residents; however, the court applied Mexican law, under which no remedy could
be had in Texas or in Mexico.
19. A similar situation exists in the area of contract conflicts, where the most
significant relationship approach found in Lilienthal v. Kaufman, note 12 supra, was
first used in Barber v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945). New York
adopted this approach in Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99, 50 A.L.R.2d
246 (1954), and since then it has been vigorously followed in the state and federal
courts of that jurisdiction, e.g., Fleet Messenger Service v. Life Ins. Co. of North
America, 315 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Global Commerce Corp., S.A. v. Clark-Babbitt
Industries, Inc., 239 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1956); Metzenbaum v. Golwynne Chemicals
Corp., 159 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d
441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 87 A.L.R.2d 1301 (1961), and cases cited therein. The approach
has also been used in other jurisdictions, Bowles v. Zimmer, 277 F.2d 868, 76 A.L.R.2d
120 (7th Cir. 1960) and Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906 (1961).
The RESTATEMZNT (S9coND), CONFLICT or LAWS (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960) § 332,
332a and 332h applies the most significant relationship theory to the adjudication of
contract conflicts, and in so doing, it rejects the vested rights approach of the original
RESTATEMENT of 1934. The vested rights theory considered the interest of the place
of contracting or place of performance as being generated immediately by the mere
incidence of such activity within that sovereign's domain. Such a sovereign had a
"vested interest" in the occurrence and vested rights in having its law relating to the
transaction enforced. This approach most often validated the lex loci contractus,
although when a question relating to performance was involved and the place of
performance was different from the place of contracting, the lex loci solutionis -
law of the place of performance - could control. With the ardent advocacy of Beale,
the Reporter for the RESTATEMZNT, the vested rights approach became the established
rule, at least by the language of the decisions. See Beale, What Law Governs the
Validity of a Contract?, 23 HARV. L. REv. 1, 79, 194 (1909-10). However, as many
critics have noted, the courts' use of the RESTATEMENT language was often no more
than token obeisance. The actual processes of decision were quite different, and the
RESTATEMENT was faulted for being unrealistic and non-representative of the case law.
See, e.g., STUMBERG, CONFLICT or LAWS 225-41 (1963) and Nussbaum, Conflict
Theories of Contracts: Cases vs. Restatement, 51 YALE L.J. 893, 901-05, 919-23 (1942).
Some of the earliest and most prominent critics were Coox, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL
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The term "most significant relationship" used by the drafters of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) shall most likely become the standard
phrase for identifying that theory which has also been known as the
"center of gravity" and "grouping of contacts" theory. All of these
terms refer to an analysis of various significant contacts or connections
or relationships that principal facts in a given case have with one or
more sovereignties. Usually, in the past the "center of gravity" of a
contract was discussed, as opposed to the "most significant relation-
ship" of a tort. "Grouping of contacts" is a general operative definition,
for that indeed is what the adjudicating court does in weighing the
factors and determining the governing law in a case. The courts must
consider the groups of contacts associated with each possible sover-
eignty and decide which group "weighs" more, i.e., which group is
indicative of the most significant relationship. With the standardiza-
tion of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) terminology, the diversity of
language previously found has yielded to the common designation and
recognition of the common meaning.
Developing parallel to the most significant relationship approach
has been Currie's governmental interest theory. 20 Essentially, Professor
Currie proposes:""
1. The court should first and always look to its own law to govern
the case, even if foreign factors are involved.
2. If it is suggested that foreign law applies, the court should
determine if there is any governmental policy related to the
case expressed in the law of the forum, and if so, whether the
factors of the case are such as to bring it within the scope of
the forum law's governmental concern; i.e., whether there
is a "legitimate basis for the assertion that the state has an
interest in the application of its policy in this instance. -2 2
Finding such a basis demands application of forum law.
BASIS OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942) and Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of
Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30 YALE L.J. 565, 655 (1921).
The most significant relationship approach is essentially identical to the long-
followed English rule of the "proper law" in the situation - the application of the
law most appropriate to the dispute. See, e.g., Mann, The Proper Law of the Contract.
3 INT'L AND COMP. L.Q. 60 (1950) and Morris and Cheshire, Proper Law of a Contract
in the Conflict of Laws, 56 L.Q. Riv. 320 (1940). The authors of the RESTATEMENr
(SEcoND) concede that the English system is almost identical to the contacts approach.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960) 5.
20. Currie developed his approach in the tort area in, Survival of Actions:
Adjudication vs. Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958),
and in the contract area in, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 227 (1958). The governmental interest theory was further
refined and elaborated in (all by Currie), On the Displacement of the Law of the
Forum, 58 CoL. L. REv. 964 (1958); Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York,
1963 DUKE L.J. 1; The Distinterested Third State, 28 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 754
(1963) ; The Verdict of Quiescent Years, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 258 (1961) ; Notes on
Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171; The Constitu-
tion and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U.
CHI. L. REV. 9 (1958). Subsequent references to these articles will be indicated by
volume and page only.
21. 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9, 10.
22. Id. at 10.
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3. If necessary, the court should then determine if a foreign
jurisdiction has a valid governmental interest in the case;
failing this - or finding a valid forum interest to summon
up forum law - the court should apply the law of the forum."
"Governmental policy" is not the same as "public policy", an old
and familiar tool in conflict of laws decisions.24 Governmental policy
is much more comprehensive, including, "social and economic policies
which are normally developed by a state in the pursuit of its govern-
mental interests and the interests of its people."25 Also, it has been
noted that "public policy" is a basically negative doctrine raised by
a court to deny application of a foreign law, while "governmental policy"
is a more positive doctrine that establishes a jurisdictional choice on
its own. 26 A governmental interest will arise - and, therefore, the lex
fori will be applied - if a governmental policy exists concurrently with
an "appropriate relationship between the state having the policy and
the transaction, the parties, or the litigation."27 Governmental interests
will usually be specific and limited, although a broader general interest
will occasionally be found.2
Currie is careful to distinguish his views from the contact approach
and is quite critical of the "weighing" process inherent in the latter.2 9
This lack of "weighing" and its subsequent freedom from entangle-
ments is claimed by Currie as the primary distinction to be drawn
between the most significant relationship and governmental interest
theories. It is true that most cases decided by Currie's system would
never reach the point of weighing at all, for the lex fori would be
immediately applied. However, it is certainly arguable that "weighing"
is involved in both theories. When a court examines governmental
interests of competing states, it must perforce use a comparative scale
and "weigh" the interests, and one must query how different this act
really is from the "weighing" of contacts." Currie's claimed distinc-
23. In the event that the forum has no valid interest at all, and justice does not
otherwise require consideration of the case, Currie advocates the invocation of the
forum non conveniens doctrine and dismissal of the plea. 28 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB.
754, 767-68.
24. RES'ATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612.
25. 58 COL. L. R8v. 964, 1007.
26. Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws - A Reply to Professor
Currie, 27 U. CI. L. Rrv. 463, 494 (1960).
27. 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 258, 290.
28. 1959 Du n L.J. 171, 181.
29. Currie feels that consideration by the court of various contacts and their rela-
tive significance is "a political function of a very high order," 1959 DUKE L.J. at 176,
and is best left to the legislatures. In a comparison of the most significant relationship
view and his own, Currie said:
"Governmental interest analysis is, of course, concerned with the ways in which
the respective states are related to the parties, the events, and the litigation; it is
impossible even to define a problem in the conflict of laws without taking account
of such relationships. Governmental interest analysis is also concerned with the
significance of those relationships. But here the resemblance ends. The 'grouping
of contacts' theory provides no standard for determining what 'contacts' are
significant, nor for appraising the relative significance of the respective groups of
'contacts'. Governmental interest analysis determines the relevance of the rela-
tionship by inquiring whether it furnishes a reasonable basis for the state's
assertion of an interest in applying the policy embodied in its law." 1963 DU'K8.
L.J. 1, 39-40.
30. A "weighing" of precisely this nature has been predicted. "The weighing of
contacts of which Auten [supra note 19] and Babcock [supra note 10] speak could
1965]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
tion is subtle at best and indicates that, indeed, the governmental interest
and most significant relationship theories are very close.
A more vital consideration is the variation in evaluation of such
factors as location, domicile, and place of contracting, which are most
important in determining the most significant relationship under the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) rule. To Currie, these are mere indicia of
possible governmental interests, and governmental policies should be
the initial area of judicial investigation. This is the true distinction -
the contrasting emphasis that is placed on underlying interests as a
valid consideration for the court. In this respect, it is notable that the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) section on torts lists an analysis of Currie's
"interests" as the last consideration, if it is involved at all.3 '
Although the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) gives little recognition to
Currie's theory, 32 the two cases here noted appear to have adopted in
varying degrees a modified governmental interest analysis in combina-
tion with contact weighing. Indeed, the Griffith case seems to rest more
substantially on Currie's analysis than it does on the most significant
relationship approach.
While a surface examination points to the use of contacts analysis,
Griffith was ultimately decided as a purely governmental interest and
policy question. The court, in its consideration of the facts of the case,
stated: "An examination of the policies which apparently underlie that
Colorado statute tends to indicate that state's lack of interest in the
amount of recovery in a Pennsylvania court . . . Pennsylvania's in-
terest in the amount of recovery, on the other hand, is great."'3  The
choice of Pennsylvania law as the governing law was made possible
initially through the state's contact as the domicile of the decedent and
his family; however, this contact investigation served only to establish
Pennsylvania's interest in the litigation as a possible competitor with
Colorado. The actual choice of law did not result from a weighing
of contacts but from the decision that no underlying policy of Colorado's
statute could overcome in importance the Pennsylvania policy of grant-
ing full recovery to surviving dependents expressed in its constitution.34
The governmental interest of the forum state was simply greater than
the governmental interest of the state of the place of wrong.
In the second of the noted cases, Dym v. Gordon, the lower court
utilized a combined contact-interest investigation" similar to that
employed in the case discussed above. The language of the decision is
easily turn into a weighing of governmental interests and social policies that grow
out of or are discoverable from the contacts." Leflar, Comments on Babcock v.
Jackson, 63 CoL. L. Rev. 1247, 1249.
31. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964),
§ 379-3, see note 7 supra. Also, one must note that the limited policy consideration
advocated here - "the relevant purposes of the tort rules" - is much narrower than
an interest or policy investigation such as Currie would seek.
32. At least one distinguished jurist has acknowledged Currie's contribution,
Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. Rzv. 657, 670 (1959).
33. Griffith v. United Air Lines, 203 A.2d 796, 807 (1964).
34. PA. CONST. art. III, § 21, note 8 supra. In a very real sense, however, this
was only a different form of "weighing," with state interests rather than contacts
on the scales. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
35. 245 N.Y.S.2d 656, 659 (1963).
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muddled,3" but the court was clearly aware of the merits of the various
state interests involved, as well as the contacts of the parties with those
states. As in Lilienthal,3 7 the court decided against the state with the
greatest number of obvious contacts, Colorado. However, the opposing
state whose law was chosen - New York - had no specific govern-
mental policy expressed in a statute. Instead, what can only be described
as New York's "interests" in the controversy tipped the scales in
favor of the choice of that state's law.3" The "interests" ranged from
providing medical care to plaintiff in New York to the New York locus
of the defendant's insurance and the permanent residence of all parties
there.3 9 Undeniably, these "interests" are also "contacts"; however,
their significance to the court here appears deeper than the simple
physical relationships indicated. Rather, they seem to imply to the
court underlying governmental interests in the Currie sense. In revers-
ing on appeal, the higher court performed nothing more than a simple
counting and adding of contacts. 40 No discussion of any interests or
policies of the competing states appears in the brief opinion.41
To have applied the unyielding standards of lex loci delicti in these
and similar situations would have been most unrealistic, and yet it is
notable that no court openly adopted the contact language until Barber
36. The court says, ". . . Colorado's contact . . . is not sufficiently significant to
warrant application of its, rather than New York's, policy." Id. at 659. It would be
more accurate to say "Colorado's governmental interest." This is a particularly good
example of the confused language still appearing in some conflicts cases. The courts
do not seem willing to follow Currie totally and do no "weighing" at all, but at the
same time, they tend to confuse contacts and interests in their evaluations of the factors
in a case.
37. Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543, 545-46 (Ore. 1964).
38. The court in Dym seemed especially concerned about defendant's insurability
and was undoubtedly influenced by Ehrenzweig, whom it cites in the opinion. This
commentator urges the application of the law defendant could best foresee being
applied and thus insure against, a realistic approach to tort remedies seeking to dis-
tribute losses. He also searches for "true rules" to follow, rather than shifting analyses
that are made on a case-to-case basis. Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of
Laws - Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability under "Foreseeable and Insurable
Laws", 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1960).
39. Dym v. Gordon, 245 N.Y.S.2d 656, at 659 (1963).
40. In the last paragraph of the opinion, the court stated: "[I]t was Colorado,
the place where the parties resided, albeit temporarily, where their guest-host rela-
tionship arose and where the trip began and was to end, rather than New York,
the place of their permanent domiciles, which had the dominant contacts and the
superior claim for the application of its law. Dym v. Gordon, 253 N.Y.S.2d 802,
804 (1964).
Unconsidered contact-counting of this sort is perhaps the greatest danger in the
most significant relationship approach. It shows little concern for the parties or states
involved in the case and provides scant guidance for judges and attorneys reading
the opinion in the future. See Comment, 51 CAL. L. Rgv. 762 (1963) and Cavers, The
Changing Choice of Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB.
732, 733-34 (1963). A similar criticism has been directed at the decision in Lowe's
North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 469
(4th Cir. 1963) in Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts
of Law of Torts, 28 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 700 (1963). The commentator argues
that decisions based on defined policies of the forum are better guideposts than un-
explained weighing of contacts. In this area, he is close to Currie's theory.
41. On July 9, 1965, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower appellate
decision in Dym, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2054 (July 27, 1965). The lengthy majority opinion
and vigorous dissent provide a thorough and searching examination of the competing
governmental interests in the case, an area which the majority feel must be surveyed
before general contacts are even considered. The decision appears to turn, however,
on the fact that the relationship between the parties arose in Colorado, and thus the
accident "could in no sense be termed fortuitous." Ibid. This consideration seems
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v. Hughes42 in the contract field and Babcock v. Jackson43 in torts.
Respecting stare decisis, they resorted to several devices to avoid
decisions demanded by the strict older rule.44 Problems presented in
contract cases were easily handled by application of whichever rule
under the vested rights theory produced the desired result.45  Torts
conflicts were not so easily handled, and the courts were forced to utilize
common exceptions such as characterization 46 of the issue as pro-
cedural47 or as a different cause of action, 48 or by purposeful selection
of the site of the wrong. 9
rather unimportant in the face of the other factors in the case, and the result would
appear to be contra to Babcock, note 10 supra, on almost identical facts.
42. 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945).
43. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
44. Currie calls this "the obeisance to the old system that was ritually observed
by pioneering rebels." The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB.
754 (1963).
45. See note 18 supra. If the court wished to shun the choice of law demanded
by the application of the lex loci contractus, it could easily decide the case was one to
be governed by the possibly different lex loci solutionis. In a case presenting arguable
facts, the place of contracting or of performance could be determined in such a manner
as to force the desired decision. As a last alternative, a court could use a procedural
ploy as discussed in note 46 infra.
46. Characterization is the technical classification of the form of the cause of
action or the technical determination of a procedural or substantive issue. It is "a
flexible legal tool which does not itself produce results inexorably, but often only
affords logical justification for results independently arrived at." Leflar, Constitutional
Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW AND CONTSMP. PROB. 706, 726 (1963).
47. By declaring that an issue is procedural in nature, a court can invoke the lex
fori and avoid application of an unwanted law. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, supra
note 10, is an excellent example of the distortion that this device can bring about.
Another notable case where this was used is Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 589, 264
P.2d 944, 42 A.L.R.2d 1162 (1953). That case involved an automobile crash in
Arizona between California residents. The survival of the action was determined to
be a procedural question going to the administration of decedent's estate; therefore,
California law governed, and the cause of action was not abated, as Arizona law
would have required. Conclusions such as these often require tortuous logical processes
and occasionally produce undesirable precedents. See generally Cook, "Substance"
and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALt L.J. 333 (1933) and LEFLAR,
CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1959) ch. 7.
48. In Levy v. Daniels, 108 Conn. 333, 143 Atl. 163 (1928), the court did not
espouse a contact theory - it had yet to be developed - but classified the action as
on a contract to avoid applying the lex loci delicti. Plaintiff was injured in an acci-
dent in Massachusetts while riding in a car negligently driven by one Sach and rented
from defendant in Connecticut. A Connecticut statute made defendant liable for injury
caused by the operation of the car while rented, and plaintiff sued for breach of
contract of this liability. In the face of defendant's argument that this was in reality
a tort action governed by the lex loci delicti and without recovery, the court held
for plaintiff. It classified the plaintiff as a member of the public, the intended
beneficiary of the regulatory statute involved here. As a third party beneficiary,
plaintiff could sue on the contract and the lex loci contractus would be applied. This
reasoning actually recognized the closer connection that Connecticut had with the
case and the more significant interest of that state.
Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959),
overruled a long line of Wisconsin cases which had held that the right of one spouse
to sue another in tort was governed by the lex loci delicti. The court "characterized"
this as a question of interfamilial domestic law rather than a tort problem; as such,
it was governed by the law of the domicile of the parties.
Thompson v. Thompson, 193 A.2d 439 (N.H. 1963), in a case with facts identical
to those in the immediately preceding case, based the decision on the "recent trends
supporting the view that interspousal immunity is to be determined according to the
law of the domicile of the parties." Id. at 440. Consideration of interests or contacts
was foreclosed by this finding.
49. In Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957), the
plaintiff was injured in an auto accident negligently caused by one Sorrenson. Defen-
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Continuation of such technical games should not have been toler-
ated for as long as it was, and the forthright use of contact-interest
language by the courts in the noted cases is refreshing. However, just
as these courts were unwilling to utilize formalistic loopholes found
in the old rules, so, too, were they, with the exception of the Appellate
Division court in Dym, apparently unwilling to accept the equally
formalistic contact-counting approach. The type of analysis performed
in the latter opinion is unsatisfactory, and the decisions in Griffith and
the first Dvm case show an awareness of this fact. The judges seem to
realize that, "The question whether a particular 'contact' is significant
is meaningless unless significance is judged in terms of lhe policies and
interests of the states involved."5 By examining the discernible con-
tacts, the court hearing a case can identify the interested jurisdictions.
To choose the ruling law at this stage of the proceedings solely on the
basis of number of contacts - as done in the second Dym decision - is
not the administration of justice, but arithmetic. The diligent court
must place the contacts it has found in the context of governmental
interests; by doing so, it may find that some assume a definite pre-
eminence and point to the correct law to be applied. 1 Contacts can do
no more than identify the jurisdictions which have an interest in the
proceedings. It is the character of the interests thus revealed which
gives significance to the contacts and informs the entire proceeding.12
dant sold liquor to Sorrenson, who was intoxicated, in violation of the Minnesota Civil
Damage Act; the accident occurred in Wisconsin. All parties involved were Minnesota
residents. The court avoided the lex loci delicti, under which defendant had no
liability, by determining the place of harm to be Minnesota, where the liquor was
sold. The court was very close to a pure contact-interest analysis: "Here all parties
involved were residents of Minnesota. Defendant was licensed under its laws and
required to operate its establishment in compliance therewith." Id. at 368. Compare
Ehrenzweig, The Place of Action in Multistate Intentional Torts: Law and Reason
vs. the Restatement, 36 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1951).
50. Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoL. L. Rv. 1233, 1235 (1963).
The author argues that the decision in Babcock is really an interest analysis. He
perhaps overstates his case, but one must admit that the court in Babcock did not
follow the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) very closely. The decision is in many respects
quite like that handed down in Griffith v. United Air Lines, the main case, and
many of Currie's comments are equally applicable to the latter case. The principal
difference between pure governmental interest analysis and the verdicts in these two
cases - and the other recent cases discussed in this note - is that the courts
insist on weighing operations. This is completely contrary to Currie's position, see
note 28 supra.
51. The court in Lilienthal v. Kaufman, ... Ore ... , 395 P.2d 543 (1964), see
note 12 supra, appeared to weigh the governmental interests of Oregon as one of the
several contacts in the case. For a more satisfactory analysis, it would perhaps be
better to increase the relative "weight" of some existing contact because of an under-
lying or connected policy, rather than add another contact to the list. Applying this
to Lilienthal, one could say that the residency of the defendant in Oregon assumed
an unusual importance because of the spendthrift policy-interest factor associated with
that operative fact. Therefore, the single contact of residency - increased in
"weight" - was sufficient in itself to balance the several contacts that California
could claim with the case. This form of analysis still allows a thorough consideration
of any government interests present, but offers a definite and constant framework
in which to operate.
52. The interplay between contacts and interests was noted by the Supreme Court
in Vanston Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161-62 (1946), where an accommoda-
tion of the "equities among the parties" and the "policies" of the interested states was
urged. The Court has approved the trend toward the contact approach, Richards v.
U.S., 369 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1962).
19651
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Before the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) is completed, the drafters should
recognize the import of the recent decisions and the influence of the
governmental interest theory on the courts.53
53. Leflar was perhaps unduly cautious in remarking, "In later years it will be
easy to merge the ideas of 'significant relationship' and 'governmental interests' . . .
it may be assumed that 'grouping of contacts' does not mean mere counting of contacts,
that qualitative rather than quantitative evaluation determines the 'most significant
relationship'. Qualitative evaluation is inevitably in terms of policies and interests,
the policies and interests that appear important to the evaluator." Leflar, Comments
on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COL. L. Rtv. 1247, 1248 (1963). Arguably, this is a fair
statement of what the courts appear to be doing already.
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